The People's Republic of China has arbitrarily detained more than one million Uyghurs and other mostly Muslim minorities in China's far western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. (1) It is estimated that 100,000 Uyghurs and other ethnic minority ex-detainees in China may be working in conditions of forced labor following detention in re-education camps. (2) Many more rural poor workers also may experience coercion without detention. (3; 4) China has been included on the List of Goods Produced by Child Labor of Forced Labor (TVPRA List) since 2009. In 2020, the Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) added five goods produced by forced labor by Muslim minorities in China to the 2020 edition of the TVPRA List. These goods include gloves, hair products, textiles, thread/yarn, and tomato products. In 2023, ILAB added an additional good, Polysilicon, produced by forced labor by Muslim minorities in China.
The production of these goods through forced labor takes place primarily in Xinjiang. (5) While previous research has focused on goods and products produced in Xinjiang, recent external reports indicate that Uyghurs also have been transported to work in other provinces in China, increasing the number of goods potentially made with forced labor and broadening the risk of forced labor in supply chains. (5; 3) Other minorities may be forced to work under the guise of "poverty alleviation" without having been detained. (6) Moreover, the government gives subsidies to companies moving to Xinjiang or employing Muslim minority workers. (2) These practices exacerbate a demand for members of Muslim ethnic minority groups that the government wants placed in work assignments where they can be controlled and watched, as well as receive Mandarin Chinese training and undergo political indoctrination. (2) Once at a work placement, workers are usually subjected to constant surveillance and isolation. Given the vast surveillance state in Xinjiang and the threat of detention, individuals have little choice but to face the difficult situations present in these work assignments. (3)
The Department of Labor's (DOL) research utilized published victims' testimonies, and media and think tank reports, to determine the various industries implicated in this system of forced labor. Given the vast state-sponsored structure in place and the control of information, it is likely that more goods also are produced with forced labor in China. (7) In July 2020, the U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security released an advisory for businesses with potential ties to Xinjiang. This business advisory, as well as the TVPRA List and ILAB's Comply Chain due diligence tool for businesses, are practical guides for raising awareness and addressing this issue. Companies with supply chains that link to China, including, but not limited to, Xinjiang, should conduct due diligence to ensure that suppliers are not engaging in forced labor. With such severe and well-documented, widespread abuses, it is important that the world remains vigilant with respect to labor and goods linked to Xinjiang, including reasonable measures to guard against complicity in these violations.
Two Stories, One Goal: Repression
The People's Republic of China officially recognizes 55 ethnic groups in addition to the Han majority. Uyghurs are one of those groups. Along with other mostly Muslim minorities in China, Uyghurs confront abuse and discrimination in places like Xinjiang and elsewhere in the country.
Uyghurs detained in camps and forced to labor in factories must endure dreadful conditions. In one internment camp in Kashgar, Xinjiang, Uyghur detainees work as forced laborers to produce textiles. They receive little pay, are not allowed to leave, and have limited or no communication with family members. If family communication and visits are allowed, they are heavily monitored or cut short. When not working, the Uyghur workers must learn Mandarin and undergo ideological indoctrination. However, these abuses are not just limited to Xinjiang.
Beyond Xinjiang, in the coastal Chinese province of Fujian, Uyghur workers at a factory in Quanzhou face similar abuses. Uyghur workers are made to live in separate dormitories from Han workers. These dormitories are surrounded by an iron gate and security cameras. When finished for the day, often working more hours than their Han co-workers, the Uyghur workers are escorted back to their dormitories by provincial police officers from Xinjiang – not Fujian. The local police say the roll call is to ensure no one is missing. Uyghur workers at this factory are not allowed to exercise their free will to leave. Even if they could leave, they would not get far, as local police have confiscated their identification materials.
Sadly, these two stories fail to capture the individual struggles of the more than one million Uyghurs and other mostly Muslim minorities arbitrarily detained in the far western region of Xinjiang and across China. These two stories are just a snapshot of the vast scale of abuse and serve as a notice for the world to ask questions, take action, and demand change.
There are reports of glove factories forcibly training and employing 1,500 to 2,000 ethnic minority adult workers with the government's support. Victim testimonies, news media, and think tanks report that factories, including for gloves, frequently engage in coercive recruitment; limit workers' freedom of movement and communication; and subject workers to constant surveillance, retribution for religious beliefs, exclusion from community and social life, and isolation. Further, reports indicate little pay, mandatory Mandarin lessons, ideological indoctrination, and poor living conditions. In some instances, workers have been reported to be subject to torture. More broadly, according to varied estimates, at least 100,000 to hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities are being subjected to forced labor in China following detention in re-education camps. In addition to this, poor workers in rural areas may also experience coercion without detention. Workers are either placed at factories within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where the camps are located, or transferred out of Xinjiang to factories in eastern China.
- Associated Press. Rights Group: Lacoste Gloves Made in Chinese Internment Camp. March 3, 2020.
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Uyghurs for Sale. March 1, 2020.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies. Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang: Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation, and Western Supply Chains. October 16, 2019.
- Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Global Supply Chains, Forced Labor, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. March 2020.
- SupChina. How Companies Profit From Forced Labor in Xinjiang. September 4, 2019.
- U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security. Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory. July 1, 2020.
- VanderKlippe, Nathan. ‘I Felt Like a Slave’: Inside China’s Complex System of Incarceration and Control of Minorities. The Globe and Mail, March 31, 2019.
- Zenz, Adrian. Beyond the Camps: Beijing's Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang. Journal of Political Risk 7, No. 12. December 2019.
- Zenz, Adrian. Xinjiang's New Slavery. Foreign Policy, December 11, 2019.
There are reports that thousands of adult ethnic minority workers are forcibly employed in factories producing hair products such as wigs. China produces more than 80 percent of the global market's products made from hair and is the world's largest exporter of these products. Victim testimonies, news media, and think tanks report that factories, including for hair products, frequently engage in coercive recruitment; limit workers' freedom of movement and communication; and subject workers to constant surveillance, retribution for religious beliefs, exclusion from community and social life, and isolation. Further, workers in these factories can be subject to regular government propaganda, extremely long hours, and little to no pay. More broadly, according to varied estimates, at least 100,000 to hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities are being subjected to forced labor in China following detention in re-education camps. In addition to this, poor workers in rural areas may also experience coercion without detention. Workers can be placed at factories within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where the camps are located, or be transferred out of Xinjiang to factories in eastern China.
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Uyghurs for Sale. March 1, 2020.
- Bagdonas, Juozapas. Tracking Down the Fruits of Xinjiang's Forced Labor Industry. The Diplomat, November 16, 2019.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies. Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang: Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation, and Western Supply Chains. October 16, 2019.
- Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Global Supply Chains, Forced Labor, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. March 2020.
- Qingqing, Chen. Industries Drive Hotan Development. Global Times, July 30, 2019.
- Radio Free Asia. Hair Product Industry Linked to Uyghur Forced Labor Booming in Xinjiang's Lop County. May 28, 2020.
- U.S. Customs and Border Protection. CBP Issues Detention Order on Hair Products Manufactured with Forced Labor in China. May 1, 2020.
- U.S. Customs and Border Protection. CBP Issues Detention Order on Hair Products Manufactured with Forced Labor in China. June 17, 2020.
- U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security. Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory. July 1, 2020.
- Zenz, Adrian. Beyond the Camps: Beijing's Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang. Journal of Political Risk 7, No. 12. December 2019.
- Zenz, Adrian. Xinjiang’s New Slavery. Foreign Policy, December 11, 2019.
There are reports that adults are forced to produce polysilicon for solar panels in China. According to estimates, over one hundred thousand Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities are being subjected to forced labor in China following detention in re-education camps, in addition to workers who may also experience coercion without detention. Workers, often from poor rural areas, have been placed at factories in industrial areas within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where the camps are located, or have been transferred out of Xinjiang to factories in other parts of China. China is the world’s largest producer of solar-grade polysilicon, and over 50 percent of the country’s production takes place in Xinjiang. Researchers note that Xinjiang is undergoing an expansion of the energy sector, including solar energy and polysilicon, and thousands of Uyghur workers have reportedly been transferred to work sites over the last five years. The polysilicon manufacturers work with the Chinese government to make use of ethnic minority groups for exploitative labor, often receiving financial incentives. Victim testimonies, news media, and think tanks report that factories frequently engage in coercive recruitment; limit workers’ freedom of movement and communication; subject workers to constant surveillance, religious retribution, physical violence, exclusion from community and social life; and threaten family members.
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Uyghurs for Sale. March 1, 2020. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale.
- Bloomberg. Secrecy and Abuse Claims Haunt China’s Solar Factories in Xinjiang. April 13, 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2023-xinjiang-solar/.
- Bloomberg. Why It’s So Hard for the Solar Industry to Quit Xinjiang. February 10, 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-10/why-it-s-so-hard-for-the-solar-industry-to-quit-xinjiang.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies. Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang. October 2020. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Lehr_ConnectingDotsXinjiang_interior_v3_FULL_WEB.pdf.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies. Addressing Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. July 2020. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200730_Lehr_XinjiangUyghurForcedLabor_brief_FINAL_v2.pdf.
- CNN. Solar panels are key to Biden's energy plan. But the global supply chain may rely on forced labor from China. May 14, 2023. https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/14/energy/china-solar-panels-uyghur-forced-labor-dst-intl-hnk/index.html.
- Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Annual Report. December 2020. https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/2020%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%20FINAL%201223.pdf.
- Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Global Supply Chains, Forced Labor, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. March 2020. https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/CECC%20Staff%20Report%20March%202020%20-%20Global%20Supply%20Chains%2C%20Forced%20Labor%2C%20and%20the%20Xinjiang%20Uyghur%20Autonomous%20Region.pdf.
- Council of Economic Advisors. Economic Impact of Polysilicon WRO memo for NSC. 2020. Source on file.
- The New York Times. Chinese Solar Companies Tied to Use of Forced Labor. January 8, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/08/business/economy/china-solar-companies-forced-labor-xinjiang.html.
- Politico Europe. Fears over China’s Muslim forced labor loom over EU solar power. February 10, 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/xinjiang-china-polysilicon-solar-energy-europe/.
- PV Magazine International. Xinjiang Sanctions and the PV Supply Chain. January 26, 2023. https://www.pv-magazine.com/2023/01/26/xinjiang-sanctions-and-the-pv-supply-chain/.
- S&P Global. Human rights allegations in Xinjiang could jeopardize solar supply chain. October 21, 2020. https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/human-rights-allegations-in-xinjiang-could-jeopardize-solar-supply-chain-60829945.
- Sheffield Hallam University. In Broad Daylight: Uyghur Forced Labour and Global Solar Supply Chains. May 2023. https://www.shu.ac.uk/helena-kennedy-centre-international-justice/research-and-projects/all-projects/in-broad-daylight.
- Solar Builder Magazine. How to ensure your solar components weren’t sourced from Xinjiang or involved forced labor. February 3, 2023. https://solarbuildermag.com/news/how-to-ensure-your-solar-components-werent-sourced-from-xinjiang-or-involved-forced-labor/.
- The Energy Daily. U.S. may boost Chinese solar tariffs over labor issue. 2023. Source on file.
- U.S. Embassy Beijing. Reporting. March 12, 2023. Source on file.
- U.S. Embassy Beijing. Reporting. May 11, 2023. Source on file.
- The Jamestown Foundation. Coercive Labor and Forced Displacement in Xinjiang’s Cross-Regional Labor Transfer Program. March 2023. https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Coercive-Labor-and-Forced-Displacement-in-Xinjiangs-Cross-Regional-Labor-Transfers-A-Process-Oriented-Evaluation.pdf?x75295.
According to think tank and media reports, the textile industry works with the Government of China to make use of adult ethnic minority groups for forced, exploitative labor. Researchers note that Xinjiang is undergoing an expansion of the textile industry, and it is possible that hundreds of thousands of workers are being subjected to forced labor as part of this effort. Victim testimonies, news media, and think tanks report that factories, including for textiles, frequently engage in coercive recruitment; limit workers' freedom of movement and communication; and subject workers to constant surveillance, retribution for religious beliefs, exclusion from community and social life, and threaten family members. Further, some workers have been subject to military-style management, government indoctrination, and are paid below the minimum wage. There are reports that adults are forced to produce textiles in China. More broadly, according to varied estimates, at least 100,000 to hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities are being subjected to forced labor in China following detention in re-education camps. In addition to this, poor workers in rural areas may also experience coercion without detention. Workers can be placed at factories within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where the camps are located, or be transferred out of Xinjiang to factories in eastern China.
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Uyghurs for Sale. March 1, 2020.
- Buckley, Chris, & Ramzy, Austin. China's Detention Camps for Muslims Turn to Forced Labor. The New York Times, December 16, 2018.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies. Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang: Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation, and Western Supply Chains. October 16, 2019.
- Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Global Supply Chains, Forced Labor, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. March 2020.
- Feng, Emily. Forced labour being used in China's 're-education' camps. Financial Times, December 15, 2018.
- NPR. 'Illegal Superstition': China Jails Muslims for Practicing Islam, Relatives Say. October 8, 2019.
- Qingqing, Chen. Industries Drive Hotan Development. Global Times, July 30, 2019.
- U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security. Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory. July 1, 2020.
- Zenz, Adrian. Beyond the Camps: Beijing's Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang. Journal of Political Risk 7, No. 12. December 2019.
- Zenz, Adrian. Xinjiang's New Slavery. Foreign Policy, December 11, 2019.
Reports indicate that more than 2,000 adult Uyghur and ethnic Kazakh workers have been involuntarily transferred out of Xinjiang to yarn factories in the east and forced to produce thread/yarn products. It also is likely that many others are subjected to forced labor at yarn factories within Xinjiang, particularly for cotton yarns. Victim testimonies, news media, and think tanks report that factories, including for thread/yarn, frequently engage in coercive recruitment; limit workers' freedom of movement and communication; and subject workers to constant surveillance, retribution for religious beliefs, exclusion from community and social life, and threaten family members. Further, workers may undergo re-education to eradicate "extremism." More broadly, according to varied estimates, at least 100,000 to hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities are being subjected to forced labor in China following detention in re-education camps. In addition to this, poor workers in rural areas may also experience coercion without detention. Workers can be placed at factories within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where the camps are located, or be transferred out of Xinjiang to factories in eastern China.
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Uyghurs for Sale. March 1, 2020.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies. Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang: Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation, and Western Supply Chains. October 16, 2019.
- Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Global Supply Chains, Forced Labor, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. March 2020.
- Dou, Eva, & Deng, Chao. Western Companies Get Tangled in China's Muslim Clampdown. The Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2019.
- U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security. Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory. July 1, 2020.
- Zenz, Adrian. Beyond the Camps: Beijing's Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang. Journal of Political Risk 7, No. 12. December 2019.
- Zenz, Adrian. Xinjiang's New Slavery. Foreign Policy, December 11, 2019.
There are reports that adults are forced to produce tomato products in China. Xinjiang is a major producer of tomato products, especially tomato paste. Victim testimonies, news media, and think tanks report that factories, including for tomato products, frequently engage in coercive recruitment; limit workers' freedom of movement and communication; and subject workers to constant surveillance, retribution for religious beliefs, exclusion from community and social life, and isolation. More broadly, according to varied estimates, at least 100,000 to hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities are being subjected to forced labor in China following detention in re-education camps. In addition to this, poor workers in rural areas may also experience coercion without detention.
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Uyghurs for Sale. March 1, 2020.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies. Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang: Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation, and Western Supply Chains. October 16, 2019.
- Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Global Supply Chains, Forced Labor, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. March 2020.
- Dou, Eva, & Deng, Chao. Western Companies Get Tangled in China's Muslim Clampdown. The Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2019.
- Malet, Jean-Baptiste. China's Tomato Paste Colonialism. Le Monde Diplomatique. June 2017.
- U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security. Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory. July 1, 2020.
- Zenz, Adrian. Beyond the Camps: Beijing's Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang. Journal of Political Risk 7, No. 12. December 2019.
- Zenz, Adrian. Xinjiang's New Slavery. Foreign Policy, December 11, 2019.
There are reports that adults are forced to work in the production of fish on China's distant-water fishing fleet. China's fleet is the largest in the world, with an estimated 3,000 fishing vessels, and contains a wide variety of vessels, from longliners to purse seiners, operating on the high seas and in foreign countries' exclusive economic zones in every region of the world. The majority of the crew on board are migrant workers from Indonesia and the Philippines, who are particularly vulnerable to forced labor. It is estimated that there are tens of thousands of workers who are sometimes recruited by agencies that deceive workers with false information regarding their wages and the terms of the contracts, and require the workers to pay recruitment fees and sign debt contracts. According to various sources, numerous incidents of forced labor have been reported on Chinese fishing vessels. While on board the vessels, workers' identity documents are often confiscated, the crew spends months at sea without stopping at a port of call, and they are forced to work 18 to 22 hours a day with little rest. Workers face hunger and dehydration, live in degrading and unhygienic conditions, are subjected to physical violence and verbal abuse, are prevented from leaving the vessel or ending their contracts, and are frequently not paid their promised wages.
- C4ADS. Fishing Vessels Associated With Forced Labor. June 22, 2020. Source on file.
- Greenpeace USA. Seabound: Journey to Modern Slavery on the High Seas. December 2019.
- Human Rights at Sea. Interview with Dr. Pengfei Zhang – Chinese Seafarers: An Invisible Group. February 10, 2017.
- International Organization for Migration. Report on Human Trafficking, Forced Labour and Fisheries Crime in the Indonesian Fishing Industry. 2016.
- Radio Free Asia. Indonesia Launches Probe After 2 Men Jump Off Chinese Fishing Boat. June 10, 2020.
- Science Advances. The Economics of Fishing the High Seas. June 6, 2018.
- South China Morning Post. Indonesian fishermen who died on Chinese boats faced abuse, 21-hour days, interviews reveal. May 12, 2020.
- Stimson Center. Casting a Wider Net: The Security Implications of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing. February 1, 2018.
- Stimson Center. Shining a Light: The Need for Transparency Across Distant Water Fishing. November 1, 2019.
- U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report: China. June 2019.
- U.S. Department of State. 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: China (Includes Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Macau). 2019.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies. Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang: Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation, and Western Supply Chains. October 16, 2019.
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Uyghurs for Sale. March 1, 2020.
- Zenz, Adrian. Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang. Journal of Political Risk. December 2019. Vols. 7, No. 12.
- NPR. ‘Illegal Superstition’: China Jails Muslims for Practicing Islam, Relatives Say. October 8, 2019.
- Zenz, Adrian. Xinjiang’s New Slavery. December 11, 2019.
- Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Global Supply Chains, Forced Labor, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. March 2020.
Country/Area |
Total Number of Goods Produced by Forced Labor |
Good(s) |
---|---|---|
China |
18 |
Artificial Flowers, Bricks, Christmas Decorations, Coal, Cotton, Electronics, Fireworks, Fish*, Footwear, Garments, Gloves*†, Hair Products*†, Nails, Polysilicon**†, Textiles*†, Thread/Yarn*†, Tomato Products*†, Toys |
Burma |
13 |
Bamboo, Beans (green, soy, yellow), Bricks, Jade, Palm Thatch, Rice, Rubber, Rubies, Sesame, Shrimp, Sugarcane, Sunflowers, Teak |
India |
8 |
Bricks, Carpets, Cottonseed (hybrid), Embellished Textiles, Garments, Rice, Sandstone*, Stones |
North Korea |
7 |
Bricks, Cement, Coal, Gold, Iron, Textiles, Timber |
Brazil |
6 |
Cattle, Charcoal, Coffee*, Garments, Sugarcane, Timber |
Pakistan |
6 |
Bricks, Carpets, Coal, Cotton, Sugarcane, Wheat |
Bolivia |
5 |
Brazil Nuts/Chestnuts, Cattle, Corn, Peanuts, Sugarcane |
Democratic Republic of the Congo |
4 |
Gold, Tantalum Ore (coltan), Tin Ore (cassiterite), Tungsten Ore (wolframite) |
Malaysia |
4 |
Electronics, Garments, Oil (palm), Rubber Gloves* |
Nepal |
4 |
Bricks, Carpets, Embellished Textiles, Stones |
Nigeria |
3 |
Cocoa, Granite, Gravel (crushed stones) |
Peru |
3 |
Brazil Nuts/Chestnuts, Gold, Timber |
Russia |
3 |
Bricks, Pornography, Timber |
Thailand |
3 |
Fish, Garments, Shrimp |
Burkina Faso |
2 |
Cotton, Gold |
Côte d’Ivoire |
2 |
Cocoa, Coffee |
Ghana |
2 |
Fish, Tilapia (fish) |
Indonesia |
2 |
Fish, Oil (palm)* |
Mexico |
2 |
Chile Peppers, Tomatoes |
Uzbekistan |
2 |
Cotton, Silk Cocoons |
Afghanistan |
1 |
Bricks |
Angola |
1 |
Diamonds |
Argentina |
1 |
Garments |
Bangladesh |
1 |
Dried Fish |
Benin |
1 |
Cotton |
Cambodia |
1 |
Bricks* |
Colombia |
1 |
Coca (stimulant plant) |
Dominican Republic |
1 |
Sugarcane |
Ethiopia |
1 |
Textiles (hand-woven) |
Kazakhstan |
1 |
Cotton |
Malawi |
1 |
Tobacco |
Mali |
1 |
Rice |
Niger |
1 |
Cattle |
Paraguay |
1 |
Cattle |
Sierra Leone |
1 |
Diamonds |
South Sudan |
1 |
Cattle |
Taiwan |
1 |
Fish* |
Tajikistan |
1 |
Cotton |
Turkmenistan |
1 |
Cotton |
Venezuela |
1 |
Gold* |
Vietnam |
1 |
Garments |
*=Additions to the List in 2020
**=Additions to the List in 2023
†=Goods from China produced by forced labor by Muslim minorities, including Uyghurs